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1. Introduction
Capital budgeting and financing decisions are two important issues that finance managers 
need to consider. The former are decisions related to a firm’s choices regarding the acqui-
sition of assets, while the latter focus on the financing decisions of those acquisitions. 
Subsequently, when the firm starts to generate profits, another decision arises – that is, 
whether to distribute a portion of earnings to shareholders or to reinvest the profits back 
into the business for further use and development (Al-Malkawi, 2008).
Dividend policy refers to the distribution of cash to shareholders. Since the level of equity 
retained in the company is affected by the amount of earnings paid out to shareholders, 
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financial managers need to make this decision carefully. Such caution is crucial, as dividend 
payouts influence the firm’s value and, most importantly, the wealth of the shareholders 
(Lease, John, Kalay, Loewenstein, & Sarig, 2000).
Much theoretical and empirical research has attempted to explain the manner in which 
dividend payments are made and the factors that influence these payout decisions. However, 
there is no consensus on the factors that influence firms’ dividend payout policies. Studies 
have nonetheless found that dividend policy patterns differ over time and across countries 
(e.g., Ramcharran, 2001). According to La Porta, Lopez De Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(2000), differences in dividend policy across countries can be explained by the variation in 
policies, including corporate governance (Mitton, 2004; Sawicki, 2009) and legal systems 
in these countries (La Porta et al., 2000; Sawicki, 2009).
Emerging markets vary from developed capital markets in many aspects. Undoubtedly, 
emerging markets are growing in size, quality, and transparency and have been able to 
attract investors and fund managers for investment. Studies have nonetheless found that 
emerging markets have lower information efficiency, are more volatile, and are smaller in 
size. Furthermore, firms in emerging markets have limited financial resources to invest, 
which may result in lower payout ratios (Kumar & Tsetsekos, 1999). It may be expected that, 
in emerging markets, the agency problem is a more serious topic for firms due to the nature 
of their ownership structure and the legal aspects that govern investors in these markets. 
However, the behaviour of dividends in these markets has not been studied extensively 
(Reddy & Rath, 2005).
Despite empirical evidence suggesting similarities in macrolevel characteristics within 
emerging markets,1 the evidence of firm-level investigations, such as dividend payout deter-
minants, has displayed great empirical disparities. For example, the effect of profitability 
on dividend payout has been noted to have a significant positive correlation in Pakistan 
(Batool & Javid, 2014), while a negative relationship was found in China (Zhao, 2014). In 
addition, while some studies2 have observed the impact of leverage on dividend policy 
to be significant and inversely related, others have noted leverage to have no implication 
for dividend policy.3 Similar divergences in evidence have also been observed regarding 
the effect of size on dividend payout. While Batool and Javid (2014) suggested that these 
variables were significantly positively correlated, other studies have ascertained that the 
relationship is insignificant (e.g., Fairchild et al., 2014; Sawicki, 2009).
In view of the above contradictory evidence, this study contributes to the literature in 
two ways. First, it attempts to shed light on the issue of dividend policy in the context of an 
emerging market. Malaysia has been chosen as the context of study, given its macroeco-
nomic stability, reputable leadership, and sound governance. Furthermore, the Malaysian 
economy has shown a good track record since its independence in 1957 and has been able 
to endure the major challenges of global economic crises. The second way in which this 
study fills the gap in the literature is by examining dividend policy across industries, as 
it can be expected that different business types may plausibly differ in dividend payment 
policies. Furthermore, it has been noted that there are very few, if any, studies comparing 
industrial differences in dividend policies.
In this vein, the objective of this study is to examine the determinants of dividend payouts 
of public listed companies in Malaysia by investigating the relationship between dividend 
payments and five independent variables – agency costs, firm size, profitability, financial 
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leverage, and growth opportunities. In addition, the study will compare the dividend policies 
of companies across industries to examine possible variations in these relationships.
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature on dividend policy. 
Section 3 explains the methodology employed, while Section 4 discusses the results. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Determinants of dividend policy
2.1. Agency costs
In the dividend irrelevance theory, Miller and Modigliani (1961) argued that there is no 
disagreement between managers and shareholders. However, the agency theory suggests 
that managers’ interests conflict with those of the shareholders. Easterbrook (1984) argued 
that there are two forms of agency cost: the cost of monitoring managers (borne by share-
holders), and cost of risk aversion (borne by the managers). Risk-averse managers do not 
like to take risks and will choose projects with lower expected returns over riskier ventures. 
However, shareholders would want managers to assume high risk ventures with higher 
expected returns (Easterbrook, 1984).
Firms that enter capital markets expose themselves to close monitoring of their managers’ 
actions by financial analysts and other investment professionals. This lowers the share-
holders’ cost of monitoring managers. It has been argued that paying dividends enhances 
the scrutiny of managers by insiders. On the other hand, it might cause managers to make 
undesirable and possibly risky decisions, such as increasing leverage (Easterbrook, 1984). 
A rational shareholder, however, would prefer dividends in order to minimise the agency 
costs of external equity (Harada & Nguyen, 2011; Rozeff, 1982).
2.2. Size
Lloyd, Jahera, and Page (1985) showed that a firm’s size plays an important role in its div-
idend policy. In other words, the larger the firm, the easier its accessibility to the capital 
market, as large firms are more mature than smaller companies. For this reason, larger firms 
should be less dependent on internal funds and would be able to pay out higher dividends. 
Meanwhile, Gugler (1997) contended that, in the US, large companies are inclined to pay 
dividends to prevent managers from investing for their own self-interest. Since small firms 
have to reinvest to grow, the funds available for dividend payouts would be reduced (Ingram 
& Lee, 1997). Brockman and Unlu (2009) found strong evidence of a positive relationship 
between the size of the firm and the dividend sizes of a large sample of firms across 52 
countries, including emerging markets such as Malaysia.
Contradictorily, other studies have failed to find any significant relationship between firm 
size and dividend payout. In the context of Iran, for example, Valipour, Rostami, and Salehi 
(2014) found an insignificant relationship between dividend payout and firm size. Mitton 
(2004), in his study of 365 firms in 19 emerging markets, also revealed similar insignificant 
results. In the context of Southeast Asian countries including Malaysia, Sawicki (2009) 
observed that size had an insignificant effect on dividend payout. Similar results were found 
both for periods before and after the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis.
EcoNoMIc RESEARcH-EKoNoMSKA ISTRAžIvANjA  253
2.3. Profitability
According to the pecking order theory, firms prefer to use their internal resources to invest, 
and when external financing is needed, debt issuance rather than equity is preferred to 
reduce information asymmetry and transactions costs (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
While managers issue risky securities with private information, the existence of asymmet-
ric information helps investors to discount newly issued and existing securities. Managers 
usually prefer to use retained earnings to finance projects, as no asymmetric information 
is involved. Since discount prices are expected, managers are hesitant to issue risky debt 
and equity.
Firms try to finance investment first with retained earnings, then with safe debt, and 
finally with equity, so as to minimise asymmetric information and other financing costs 
(Fama & French, 2002). However, high profitability firms tend to have stable internal sources 
of funds. When these internal funds are declining, the firm will shift to external financing 
(Vanacker & Manigart, 2010).
Since outside funds are costly to obtain for companies with less profitable assets, div-
idends are less attractive. Thus, it can be argued that a firm’s profit is positively related to 
dividend payout (Fama & French, 2002; Han, Lee, & Suk, 1999; Jensen, Solberg, & Zorn, 
1992; Lintner, 1956; Valipour et al., 2014). In a study of a large sample of firms across more 
than fifty countries, Brockman and Unlu (2009) found a significant positive relationship 
between net income (a proxy for profits) and dividend amounts. Consistent results were 
found in a study in the context of emerging markets (Mitton, 2004). However, Sawicki 
(2009) failed to find any significant relationship between profit and dividend payout in the 
context of five Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia.
2.4. Financial leverage
Studies have found that companies with higher levels of debt tend to pay low dividends in 
order to reduce transaction costs (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Kashif, 2011; Rozeff, 1982). 
Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994) suggested that all equity firms pay higher dividends than 
leveraged firms in order to reduce the agency problem of free cash flows, and the findings 
display an inverse relationship between dividend payouts and financial leverage. In addition, 
the results of a study conducted in Japan showed that the debt ratio of high dividend payers 
was significantly lower than that of low dividend payers (Kato, Loewenstein, & Tsay, 2002).
2.5. Growth opportunities
Miller and Modigliani (1961) argued that dividend policy and investment decisions are inde-
pendent of each other. However, market imperfections imply that there may be a connection 
between the two. Milgrom and Roberts (1992), p. 507) argued that dividend payments were 
higher in slow growth industries. However, firms with profitable growth opportunities have 
limited free cash flows and pay lower dividends in order to decrease their dependence on 
external financing. Hence, high growth firms need funds to finance in investment opportuni-
ties, resulting in lower dividends. In contrast, firms with low investment opportunities would 
reasonably pay more dividends, consistent with the free cash-flow hypothesis (Gul, 1999).
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The residual theory suggests that dividends are paid after all investment opportuni-
ties have been financed. Hence, a negative relationship between dividends and external 
financing is expected (Alli, Khan, & Ramirez, 1993). Similar evidence has been found in 
the context of emerging markets; for example, Mitton (2004) found a significant negative 
relationship between the growth and dividend payouts of firms, while Brockman and Unlu 
(2009) observed consistent evidence of a strong negative relationship between sales growth 
and dividend amounts in firms across countries. Other studies have also found a significant 
relationship between investment opportunity and dividend policy (e.g., Barclay, Smith & 
Watts, 1995; Fama & French, 2002), while others have found that investment opportunity 
does not have any implications for the firm’s dividend policy (e.g., Abbaszadeh & Beigi, 
2014; Sawicki, 2009).
3. Methodology
3.1. Data and selection of firms
Financial data for Malaysian public listed firms in the period 2005 to 2009 was obtained 
from the Bloomberg database for empirical analysis. To enhance the quality of the data 
gathered for analysis, we imposed two selection criteria. First, we excluded utility compa-
nies (electricity, gas, and water utility firms) and financial institutions (banks, insurance 
companies, and unit trust firms) from the selection process. Utility firms were omitted 
because they have fully regulated dividend payout policies (see, Zunaidah & Fauzias, 2008), 
while financial institutions are governed by specific regulations and have different financial 
reporting standards to other industries. Second, firms that were selected must have made at 
least made one dividend payment during the period of study (see, Appannan & Sim, 2011).
Initially, a total of 978 firms were listed on the Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange. After 
applying the two selection criteria, a sample of 640 firms was chosen for our dividend policy 
determinant analysis. Next, these firms were segregated into eight different industry types 
based on the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) consisting of Basic material, 
Technology, Industrial, Consumer Cyclical, Consumer Noncyclical, Communication, Energy, 
and Diversified Industries.
3.2. Measurement of variables and model specification
To study the determinants of Malaysian firms’ dividend payout policies, an unbalanced panel 
regression estimation model was used. From the financial data of firms in the sample, the 
dependent and independent variables were first computed using the measurements specified 
in Table 1. The dependent variable is dividend payout, while the independent variables are 
agency cost, firm size, profitability, leverage, and growth.
The dividend payout is estimated using a panel regression model:
 
where β0 is the intercept, DIV_PAYOUTit represents dividend yield, AGENCY_COSTit is 
the firm’s free cash flow, SIZEit denotes the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation, 
PROFITit refers to earnings per share, LEVERAGEit represents the debt-to-equity ratio, 
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GROWTHit refers to free cash flow, εit is the error term, andνit is the cross-sectional error 
term (for the random effects model). To identify the suitability of the fixed or random panel 
estimation process to the tested series, the Hausman test was employed.
3.3. Hypotheses development
3.3.1. Agency cost hypothesis
The agency problem occurs because agents may invest in projects that will maximise their 
own welfare. On the other hand, managers may take actions that are unprofitable and costly 
for the shareholders. The agency cost hypothesis suggests that dividend payments can alle-
viate agency problems (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen et al., 1992; Rozeff, 1982). When cash 
resources are distributed, the size of internally generated funds available to the agents are 
reduced; hence, firms are forced into capital markets to gain external financing (Easterbrook, 
1984; Fairchild et al., 2014; Mohd, Perry, & Rimbey, 1995; Zhao, 2014). By reducing the 
agency costs associated with monitoring managers, dividend payments would benefit the 
shareholders. Hence, it is hypothesised that:
 Hypothesis 1. There is a significant positive relationship between dividend payments and 
agency costs.
3.3.2. Firm size hypothesis
Higgins (1972) suggested that larger firms are more likely to pay higher dividends to share-
holders than small firms because they have more flexibility in raising funds from capital 
markets. Similar positive relationships were noted in prior studies (e.g., Batool & Javid, 
2014; Brockman & Unlu, 2009; Gugler, 1997; Ingram & Lee, 1997; Lloyd et al., 1985). Thus, 
it is hypothesised that:
 Hypothesis 2. There is a significant positive relationship between dividend payouts and 
firm size.
3.3.3. Profitability hypothesis
A firm’s net earnings are a significant determinant of dividend payments (Batool & Javid, 
2014; Fama & French, 2002; Han et al., 1999; Jensen et al., 1992; Lintner, 1956; Valipour et 
Table 1. List of variables and their measurements.
note: the dependent variable is DIV_PAYOUT; the independent variables are AGENCY, SIZE, PROFIT, LEVERAGE, and GROWTH.
source: created by author based on literature review.
variables Names Measurement
DIV_PAYOUT Dividend per Share
Market Value per Share
AGENCY EBIT(1-Tax Rate) + Depreciation & Amortisation - Change in Net Working Capital - Capital Expenditure
SIZE ln(Number of Shares outstanding × market price per share)
PROFIT Net Income after tax
Number of Share Outstanding
LEVERAGE Total Debt
Total Shareholder Equity
GROWTH Market Value per Share
Book Value per Share
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al., 2014). Thus, it is expected that profitability is a key determinant of corporate dividend 
policy among Malaysian public listed companies.
 Hypothesis 3. There is a significant positive relationship between paying dividends and 
profitability.
3.3.4. Financial leverage hypothesis
Financial leverage is posited to affect dividend policy. By acquiring debt, a firm commits 
itself to repay fixed financial charges in the form of interest payments and the principal 
amount. Firms need to pay for their obligations, and they thus need to maintain their 
internal cash flow rather than paying dividends to shareholders. Hence, other things being 
equal, an inverse relationship between dividend payouts and financial leverage is posited 
(Agrawal & Jayaraman, 1994; Batool & Javid, 2014; DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Kashif, 2011; 
Kato et al., 2002; Rozeff, 1982; Zhao, 2014)
 Hypothesis 4. There is a significant negative relationship between dividend payments and 
financial leverage.
3.3.5. Growth and investment opportunities hypothesis
Miller and Modigliani (1961) argued that, with market imperfections, dividend payments 
and investment opportunities may be related to each other. As firms with higher growth and 
investment opportunities need to generate funds for investment, they would prefer to pay 
low dividends. In contrast, there are firms with slower growth that are likely to pay greater 
dividends. This notion is consistent with the free cash-flow hypothesis and the pecking 
order theory, and is also supported by the literature (e.g., Alli et al., 1993; Barclay, 1995; 
Batool & Javid, 2014; Brockman & Unlu, 2009; Fama & French, 2002; Gul, 1999; Milgrom 
& Roberts, 1992). Hence, it is postulated that:
 Hypothesis 5. There is a significant negative relationship between dividend payments and 
growth opportunities.
4. Results
4.1. Determinants of dividend payment: full model
This study investigates the role of firm-specific characteristics in determining the dividend 
decisions of Malaysian firms using estimates from panel regression models. Table 2 presents 
the results of the full model that estimates the relationship between DIV_PAYOUT and the 
five independent variables (AGENCY, SIZE, PROFIT, LEVERAGE, and GROWTH).
Table 2 suggests that three out of the five independent variables are significantly related 
to DIV_PAYOUT. Specifically, the posited hypotheses H2, H3, and H4 failed to be rejected, 
whereby the variables SIZE, LEVERAGE, and PROFIT were found to be significantly related 
to dividend payout. However, the signs of the relationships for H2 and H3 were found to 
be negative, contrary to expectations. Meanwhile, the results show that there is no signif-
icant relationship between DIV_PAYOUT and two independent variables, AGENCY and 
GROWTH, thereby rejecting H1 and H5.
EcoNoMIc RESEARcH-EKoNoMSKA ISTRAžIvANjA  257
The evidence reveals a significant inverse relationship between DIV_PAYOUT and SIZE 
(β = -1.468, p < 0.01). Although significant, this finding contradicts the positive relationship 
observed in prior studies (for example, in Lloyd et al. (1985) in the context of a developed 
market; in Brockman and Unlu (2009), who examined dividend policy in 52 countries; and 
in Batool and Javid (2014), in the context of emerging markets). A possible explanation for 
these results is that shareholders in larger firms have less power to control their manager’s 
decisions in managing the firm’s excess free cash flow, as suggested by Mahadwartha (2007). 
Furthermore, there is a tendency for these managers to restrict the firm’s free cash flow for 
their own interest. Thus, as the results suggest, larger firms tend to have a smaller dividend 
payout for their shareholders.
Consistently with the literature on developed markets4 and emerging markets,5 
LEVERAGE is negatively related to a firm’s dividend payout, significant at the 5% level 
(β = 0.001, p < 0.05). This suggests that highly leveraged firms have lower dividend payouts. 
Reasonably, when firms rely more on debt than on equity, they tend to expose themselves 
to financial distress risk. A higher level of financial leverage will overburden the firm with 
high interest payments in the long run. Since they are burdened with these interest payment 
obligations, firms may not be able to sustain stable profits in the long run. Hence, firms face 
a higher risk of bankruptcy since they are not able to fulfil their long-term debt obligations. 
Additionally, firms place higher priority on their debt obligations than on their obligations 
to shareholders; therefore, more highly leveraged firms tend to have lower dividend payout.
Studies have shown that profitability is one of the most important variables in influenc-
ing the level of dividend payout in the US, as well as in many emerging markets (Aivazian, 
Booth, & Cleary, 2003; Batool & Javid, 2014; Brockman & Unlu, 2009; Mitton, 2004). 
However, in the Malaysian context, the same does not hold true. In contrast to Fama and 
French (2002), PROFIT shows a significant inverse relationship with dividend payout for 
Malaysian firms (β = -0.439, p < 0.10). Similar findings were reported in Gupta and Banga 
(2010), in which PROFIT displayed an inverse though insignificant relationship with div-
idend payouts in Indian corporations.
In summary, the results suggest that size and leverage play a significant positive influence, 
while profitability has a significant negative impact on the dividend payout for Malaysian 
firms. On the other hand, agency cost and growth do not determine dividend payment 
policies in the context of Malaysian firms.
Table 2. Determinants of dividend payment (full model).
note: Dependent variable is DIV_PAYOUT.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
source: author’s calculations using E-views version 8.
variable β Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
c 33.323 4.002 8.328 0.000
AGENCY 0.001 0.000 1.351 0.177
SIZE -1.468 0.209 -7.034 0.000***
PROFIT -0.439 0.266 -1.652 0.099*
LEVERAGE -0.001 0.000 -2.412 0.016**
GROWTH -0.015 0.015 -0.978 0.328
R2 = 0.588, adj. R2 = 0.436
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4.2. Determinants of dividend payment: interindustry analysis
According to Al-Malkawi (2008), industry effects do not seem to have any impact on cor-
porate dividend decisions in Jordan. However, different industries have different business 
natures and operate differently. Certain industries, such as Consumer Noncyclical industries, 
for example, tend to maintain higher levels of cash provision than other industries. Some 
industries are highly leveraged with minimal profitability, such as the Aviation industry, 
which falls under the Industrial sector. Emery, Finnerty, and Stowe (2004) highlight that the 
Diversified, Industrial, and Basic Materials industries in the US tend to have lower dividend 
payouts than the Utility industry. Hence, it is conjectured that corporate dividend patterns 
and dividend payout policies may vary across industries.
To test the possible variations in dividend policy across industries, firms in the sample 
were classified by industry as Basic Material, Technology, Industrial, Consumer Cyclical, 
Consumer Noncyclical, Communication, Energy and Diversified. The estimations of equation 
(1) were run and the results are presented in Table 3.
The results show that agency cost is generally not a significant determinant of dividend 
policy for most of the industries, which is consistent with results of the full model. However, 
agency cost is found to be a significant determinant for one particular industry – the Basic 
Material industry (β = 0.010, p < 0.01). For this industry, firms with higher levels of free 
cash flow tend to pay lower dividends to their shareholders. A likely explanation for this is 
that when these commodity-related manufacturing firms have larger amounts of free cash 
flow, internal sources of funds for their new project developments are more abundant, as 
less cash flow is allocated to the shareholders. However, this result contradicts the existing 
literature. This divergence might be due to differences in the proxy used for agency cost. 
Most of the other studies used insider ownership and dispersion of ownership as proxies for 
agency cost, while this study used free cash flow as the proxy, causing variances in the results.
From the findings, it can be noted that firm size has a significant negative relationship 
with dividend payout in five out of eight industries – namely, the Technology (β = -3.679, 
Table 3. Determinants of dividend policy across industries.
notes: Dependent variable is DIV_PAYOUT. standard Errors are provided in parentheses.
***, **, *indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
source: author’s calculations using E-views version 8.










c 77.268 56.447 38.927 40.873 4.909 19.749 -77.166 -3.836
[23.978]*** [6.749]*** [11.341]*** [17.390]** [26.051] [9.517]** [26.554]*** [26.862]
AGENCY -0.003 0.001 -0.000 -0.010 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001
[0.015] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005]** [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
SIZE -3.679 -2.693 -1.749 -1.891 0.011 -0.711 4.058 0.372
[1.299]*** [0.357]*** [0.579]*** [0.937]** [1.341] [0.509] [1.323]*** [1.290]
PROFIT 0.819 -0.862 1.883 -1.704 6.451 1.224 -4.457 −0.183
[1.477] [0.309]*** [1.261] [1.849] [3.700]** [1.396] [2.747] [0.894]
LEVERAGE -0.002 0.0003 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.010 0.002
[0.001]*** [0.001] [0.001]* [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.017] [0.013]
GROWTH 0.048 -0.029 -0.017 -0.021 -0.108 -0.063 0.011 0.045
[0.089] [0.023] [0.031] [0.070] [0.073] [0.045] [0.136] [0.070]
R2 0.645 0.653 0.586 0.597 0.588 0.683 0.676 0.766
adj. R2 0.455 0.517 0.406 0.403 0.347 0.542 0.421 0.532
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p < 0.01), Industrial (β = -2.693, p < 0.01), Consumer Noncyclical (β = -1.749, p < 0.01), Basic 
Material (β = -1.891, p < 0.05), and Diversified sectors (β = 4.058, p < 0.01). Zhao (2014) 
observed that firm size had the opposite significant relationship with dividend payout in 
China. Consistent with Zhao (2014), the results of the present study also reveal significant 
inverse relationships for the first four industries, suggesting that larger firms in these four 
industries are less willing to pay higher dividends. However, a positive relationship between 
size and dividend payout is displayed in the Diversified industry, similar to results of past 
studies (e.g., Barclay, Smith, & Watts, 1995; Lloyd et al., 1985). Smaller firms tend to have 
limited funds and are restricted in raising their capital via external sources. Having limited 
internal funds to finance their projects, only a small proportion is left to be allocated to 
their shareholders. Hence, these smaller firms are likely to pay smaller dividends to their 
shareholders.
The evidence shows that profitability has a significant influence on dividend policy for 
only two industries – Industrial (β = -0.862, p < 0.01) and Communications (β = 6.451, 
p < 0.05). However, the signs of the relationship are opposite, being negative for Industrial 
and positive for Communications. The negative sign for the Industrial industry is consistent 
with the full model, while results for the Communications sector are consistent with past 
studies (e.g., Aivazian et al., 2003; Brockman & Unlu, 2009; Fama & French, 2002; Han et al., 
1999; Jensen et al., 1992; Mitton, 2004; Valipour et al., 2014). Firms with higher profitability 
levels are more likely to pay higher dividends to their shareholders (Fama & French, 2002; 
Han et al., 1999; Jensen et al., 1992).
The relationship between financial leverage and dividend payout is significant for firms 
in two industries – Technology (β = -0.002, p < 0.01) and Consumer Noncyclical (β = -0.002, 
p < 0.10), both with negative signs. One possible explanation for this is that debt obligations 
for smaller firms are more important than shareholder obligations. More highly leveraged 
firms will have low dividend payouts, since these highly leveraged firms need to fulfil their 
fixed debt obligation first. These results are consistent with the literature (e.g., Agrawal 
& Jayaraman, 1994; Batool & Javid, 2014; DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Kashif, 2011; Kato 
et al., 2002; Rozeff, 1982; Zhao, 2014).
Overall, it can be concluded that the determinants of dividend policy vary across indus-
tries in Malaysia. For the Technology and Consumer Noncyclical industries, size and lev-
erage play an important role in determining dividend payout for firms. For the Industrial 
sector, size and profitability significantly affect the dividend policy of firms. For the Basic 
Material industry, two variables – agency cost and size – are important factors influencing 
dividend policy. For the Communications and Diversified industries, only one out of five of 
the independent variables is significant for each – profit and size, respectively. However, 
for the Consumer Cyclical and Energy industries, none of the posited relationships are sta-
tistically significant in determining the dividend policy. Possibly, the Energy (petrol, gas, 
coal, power) and Consumer Cyclical (housing, retail, entertainment) industries are more 
sensitive to macroeconomic and business cycle conditions, and hence their dividend pol-
icies may have a more significant impact on macroeconomic variables than firm-specific 
factors. Lastly, the results of the segregated models show that growth opportunity is not a 
significant determinant of dividend payout policies in any of the industries in Malaysia.
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5. Conclusion
This study examined the determinants of dividend policy in the context of Malaysia as an 
emerging market, and further scrutinised these relationships across eight different industries. 
In general, firm size, leverage position and profitability were found to be significantly related 
to dividend policy of firms in Malaysia, all with negative signs of relationship. However, 
when segregated by industry, divergences in the findings were evident. While agency cost 
was discovered to be an insignificant driver of the dividend policy of Malaysian firms in 
general, the same variable was found to be positively related to dividend policy for Basic 
Material industry. As with the full model, firm size, profitability, and financial leverage were 
found to be significantly related to several of the industries. The signs, however, were mixed.
Overall, it can be noted is none of the independent variables were significant deter-
minants of dividend policy for the Consumer Cyclical or Energy industries. Furthermore, 
growth opportunities during the period of study (2005–2009) had no impact on the level 
of dividend payment for any of the industries, whether singularly or collectively.
The results of this study provide objective indications to investors regarding the factors 
that determine dividend policies of Malaysian firms. For example, to make new investment 
decisions, an investor may want to pay attention to profit (earnings per share), as the empir-
ical results provide evidence that this factor is indeed an important factor determinant of 
dividend policy in Malaysian public listed companies. In addition, investors should also 
consider looking at the size of a firm in determining the selection of stocks. On the other 
hand, a firm’s free cash flow may be ignored by potential investors, as this factor appears to 
be irrelevant to the dividend policies of Malaysian firms.
Finally, the results demonstrate that most of the theoretical underpinnings on dividend 
policy that are typically based on advanced economies can be applied to emerging markets 
such as Malaysia. This is because most of the factors that were found to be important in 
determining dividend payments in Malaysia were consistent with those found in developed 
markets. However, future research may investigate the impact of other firm-specific factors 
encompassing corporate governance aspects on the dividend policy of emerging markets.
Notes
1.  See for example, De Santis (1997) on the topic of stock market volatility; Hull and McGroarty 
(2014) on the issue of stock market efficiency; Felman et al. (2014) focusing on capital market 
structures; and Mendoza and Smith (2014) on the area of contagion effects of global financial 
shocks.
2.  For example, in the context of China (Zhao, 2014); and in the context of Pakistan (Batool 
& Javid, 2014).
3.  For example, in the context of Thailand (Fairchild, Guney, & Thanatawee, 2014).
4.  See, for example, Jensen et al. (1992), Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994), Faccio, Lang, & Young 
(2001), and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003).
5.  See, for example, Batool and Javid (2014), Zhao (2014), and Arko, Abor, Adjasi, and Amidu 
(2014).
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